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M U RRAY : FAITHFUL TO
TRADITION IN CONTEXT

Thomas Hughson, S.J.

Catholics and other Christians most likely know John Courtney Murray
as a protagonist in the production of the Declaration on Re Hgious Freedom at the Second Vatican Council, published almost forty years ago.
Its significance for the public Jjfe of Catholicism in religiously pluralist
societies remruns hard to overestimate. Social ethics, fundamental theology, practical theology, public theology, and communications are
theological specialties that also have found substance in his writings.
Murray's thought on the twin topics that preoccupied so much of
rus reflection, Church-state relation and religious liberty, might seem
defined by ties to his native land, the United States, and its charter documents to which he appealed, the Declaration of Independence, the
Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. Still, the Catholic breadth of his
vision is indicated by his study at the Gregorian University in Rome in
the late 1930s while a young Jesuit, his academic sojourn in Germany,
his dissertation on Matthias Scheeben's doctrine on faith in 1937, his
continual reading of history, his attention to World War II and international affairs, his participation in post-World War U assistance to German reconstruction, his career-l ong interest in ecumenical and
interreligious cooperation for the social common good, and his awareness of Hrruts and defects in the culture of the United States.
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In the 1940s and into the 1950s some public Protestant doubt circulated on why and how deeply their Catholic fellow citizens endorsed
what many regarded as a signal novelty and essential· institution in the
democratic structures of the United States-the First Amendment guarantee of free exercise and qf the nonestablishment of religion. No
doubts accompanied the Protestant observation that Catholics in practice supported nonestablishment and religious freedom. The question
remained, was that practice princ ipled? Or was it an expedient adjustment to national facts Catholics wished were otherwise, and which they
might seek to change if they became numerous enough ? Might Catholics be harboring reservations about the First Amendment clauses out of
a deeper preference for an established Catholicism that papal teaching
recommended as best? This was a question about Catholic thought,
principle, and theory, not about practice. It was an impertine nt question
for families whose children had perished in military service under an
oath to uphold the Constitution, but it needed an answer, and an answer
in the realm of theory.
In response, starting in the mid-1940s, Murray launched an almost
career-long inquiry into religious freedom and Church-state relations.
The two topics are indissociable. Rebgious freedom in any society
flourishes or does not according to the political organization of society;
the state possesses a monopoly on legitimate use ·of coercive force in
society, and the . government exercises it. Religious freedom depends
for protection, or suffers abuse, depending on the manner and scope of
that governmental exercise of power.
Unfortunately, Catholics in the United States were not lacking a fe w
writers who championed the thesis/hypothesis theory propounded as
Catholic doctrine by, among others, Vatican Secretary of the Hol y Office Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani . His vie w lifted up national establishment of the Catholic Church as the ideal or thesis, and relegated
anything else, such as the United States arrangement, to the i~ ferior
status of being merely a hypothesis.
By the time Pope John XXIII convoked Vatican II, Murray had become the foremost American Catholic theorist on rel igious liberty.
Murray had entered into controversy in national public life in defense
of governme nt aid to Catholic schools as well as by arguing for recovery of a " public philosophy" of natural Jaw truths and values. Before
the 1960 presidential election, the Kennedy campa ign staff consulted
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hjm on Church-state relations prior to a famo us speech Kennedy delivered to ministers in Houston, Texas, which was intended to help set
aside fears that a Catholic in the White Ho use would mean a pope telephoning instructions to guide presidential decisions. A short time after
Kennedy ' s victory, on December 12, 1960, Time magazine featured
Murray o n its cover.
At Vatican U, Murray was appointed "first scribe" in the comrrussion charged with produc ing a text on religious li berty. This gave him
an important role in shaping the document without his being the single
architect. The final document promulgated on December 7, 1965, above
the signatures of Paul VI and the assembled bishops, had undergone
significant change since its inception. In the commission Murray had
steadily argued through five drafts that religious liberty was best understood as primarily a political and legal reality that owed its existence to
modern consciousness and institu tions, not directly to Churc h initiatives. Affirming religious liberty by declaring official Catholic approval
of an already familiar idea, practice, and set of institutions was a belated
aggiornamento, not a groundbreaking development. Modesty, even a
little chagrin not triumphal ism, was appropriate in view of post-Tridentine Church-state relationships in the area of religious liberty.
Murray had long he ld that prior centuries, during which the gospel
exercised a leavenjng influence in western political self-understandings
and practices, provided a basis for a modern consciousness of human
dignity and the legal institutions designed to protect its realization in
practice. Well versed in the historical record of protracted conflicts between Church authorities and political leaders from Consta ntine on, he
also pointed out repeated assertions of papal independence in judgment
and ministry. The mustard seed of post-Constantinian papal defe nse of
the libertas ecclesiae (freedom of the Church) became a tree of faith
sheltering both civil society and the eventual emergence of demands for
individual freedom in religion.
T hat tree had sometimes been shaken, as with Innocent Ill , who
crowded out political authority on the premise that all temporal as well
as spirit~al power passed from Jesus to Peter to popes, and on that foundation he believed that popes rightly seated and unseated emperors and
kings. The ancient dualism of Pope Gelasius had not been forgotten,
however. In A.D. 494, Gelasius wrote to Emperor Anastasios 1: "Two
there are, august Emperor, but which this world is ruled on the title of

I 12 I Thomas Hughson, S. J.

original and sovereign right- the consecrated authority of the priesthood and the royal power." Recalling this vision was Leo XIII 's
achievement and to develop it was Murray's continuing task. This dualism was, Murray agreed; the major impact o.f Christianity on political
life, and applied Jesus' God/Caesar diffe rence.
On the basis of this dia;chy, Murray recognized the legitimacy of
royal clai ms to independence from ecclesiastical jurisdiction in political
judgment and action. His views increasingly foUowed Thomas Aquinas
and John of Paris on the natural law, temporal purposes of the political
structures in any society. He came to disagree with Robert BeJiarmine's
proposal that in religious emergencies, not as a regular matter, a pope
could temporarily exercise authority over a political area for a good
spiritual end. This limit purified the exercise of apostolic jurisdiction
wi thout infringing on the duty to teach the gospel. Contrarily, even if
requested by a pope or bishop on behalf of a society's spiritual welfare,
any governmental repression of heresies prec isely as religious doctrines
and practices overstepped the bounds of pol itical authority, though a
state always had a duty toward public order, safety, and civil morality.
Murray assi milated the nineteenth-century papacy's critique of the
supremacy of the individual reason (continental liberalism), especially
when writ large as a nation-state's supreme authority in all zones of
socia l existence (totalitarianism). Consequently he contrasted the
Anglo-American tradition of constitutional gove~ment (which he considered unknown to Leo Xlll), including the United States constitutional provisions of nonestablishment and re ligious liberty, to
continental state absolutism (which Leo knew from the French Revolution and its aftermath). He argued that medieval recognition that the
consent of the governed belonged to the legitimacy of political authority passed to the founding of the United States, not through the Catholic
nations of continental Eu rope, but through England, where the Magna
Carta in 12 15 initiated a long train of curtailments to monarchical
power. The concept of a divine right, absolute monarch in Europe was
a bad idea with demonstrably negative consequences. Governa nce
under a constitution was' a much better political idea because governmental exerc ise of power was submitted to the rule of known public
law. It Was more congruent with Gelasian dualism than was, for example, L'etat c'est moi.
Murray focused to a surprising extent on what today would be called
political culture and civil society, not solely on laws, structures, and the
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technical procedures of democracy. In fact, the theoretical and operational priority of society over the state was both a cardinal emphasis in
Catholic social teaching and was the hallmark of resistance to totalitarianism of the right or left. Simply put, the state and government existed
for the good of society and the people·, not the other way around. States
and governments, however, have a momentum of their own that tends
to reverse this. Nor do I think Murray would have expected that a democracy would spring up like a mushroom, in Russia for example, if
only a stone of oppressive state fascism were removed. A functional
civil society is a more substantial prerequisite for democracy than a
warehouse filled with voting booths.
Moreover, Murray's understanding of civil society and political culture was thoroughly historical. He stated that, " the Bill of Rights is not
a piece of eighteenth-century rationalist theory; it is far more the product of Christian history." Behind it lay not John Locke's books so much
as a lengthy British progress toward the commonly accepted " rights of
an Englishman." And underpinning that progress were people who had
learned their human dignity "in the schoof of Christian faith," and a
political culture that developed and applied the principle of the consent
of the governed under a rule of law.
In that light, free exercise of re ligion is a public, social conditio'n
dependent on a state respecting the limits of its authority, which is to
say that this authority is nonex istent in regard to religion. Historical
arrival at this position depends on a prior affirmation of human dignity
and on some manner of religion-state dualism. On the dualist premise,
political governance for Christians-and perhaps unlike Church or religious authority in a non-Christian re ligion- has no authority from the
Creator to define or decide religious belief, practice, or institutional existence, though it must see to public safety, order, and morality. In the
founding of the United States, for example, it was not the religion
clauses in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights that anchored protection for liberty of religion. The clauses simply made explicit the civil
liberties of individuals in a limited state with enumerated powers. Authority to establish religion or prevent its free exercise was not on the
list of powers. The Constitution already, before the Bill of Rights, had
eliminated establishment and assured free exercise.
Keeping in mind the formative English history behind the Constitution leads us to a realization that some form of widespread education
accessible to a people, rather than simply elections, is the first step in
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formjng a democratic state. In trying to support democracies around the
world, Western powers may look too much to elections, written laws,
and a wi ll ingness to compromjse, while scanting the essential roles of
education, political culture, and formation in human .dignity. Likewise,
human rights monitors attending to freedom of religion hopefully attend carefully to a people's whole everyday way of life and their culture
rather than only to written statutes. De facto conditions, not simply de
j ure documentation, need to weigh heavily in any plans to form or support democracy. Murray emphasized that the founding of the United
States was not according to a preconceived, doctrinaire plan.
An alternative perspective argued within the Vatican II preparatory
commission focu sed on individual human rights. This view of the
human and civil right to religious liberty revolves around individual
human rights, and around the freedom of individual conscience, or in
the Catholic version, the dignity of the human person that grounds the
" rights of man." Once the conciliar text embraced the principle, it had
to balance it with a teachjng that the innate obligatjon to the truth, not
arbitrary personal preference, formed personal freedom of conscience
and religion. Murray fell ill and was hospitalized during the final rewrite of the document. So in the final text the " individual" argument
assumed a larger role than it would have if Murray had been active. He
saluted its publication with two cheers, not three.
Murray upheld, of course, freedom of conscience and the dignity of
the person as essential to civil society. Christian· freedom was something more. It had a communal aspect, and sprang from the new human
situation due to Christ, the gospel, and the Holy Spirit. It flourished
insofar as Christians opened themselves to the leading of God, and issued in zeal for the gospel. It also pertained to life inside the Church.
After the Council, Murray commented that Vatican II moved the
Church out of a post-Tridentine configuration in regard to Christian
freedom. Four centuries of understandable pastoral reaction to rejections of ecclesiastical authority, first by the Reformation and then by
the Enlightenment, amounted to hypertrophy of the principle of authority, with a correlatjve atrophy of the principle of freedom in the Church.
Conciliar renewal reaffirmed Christian freedom.
But in civil society Murray thought protection for free exercise of
reli gion came first and foremost from circumscribing state authority
with in due bounds, not from asserting individual freedoms. The text
voted by the bishops and signed by Pope Paul VI, nonetheless, offers
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more common ground with Protestant understandings of religious freedom, and so better serves the ecumenical goal of the Council. Murray's
approach remains a sign of Catholic understanding that social and political dimensions are internal to perso_nal liberty, not added on from outside to a purely individual or private reality.

Two

DRAM AS

Was the contest between alternative views of religious liberty w ithin the
drafting commission the central drama of Murray's theological career?
Probably not. True, all his previous research and reflection indeed came
into play-the stakes were high, the differences real, the arguments
sharp. But the commission was, after a ll, collaborative if strenuous.
Any conflict was subordinate to a common purpose. There were, however, two conflicts in Murray's life as a theologian that do qualify as
major dramas. Both arose from the fact that Catholicism in the United
States has had a quality of originality that American Protestants and
European Catholics alike had a hard time locating. Drama involves a
main character contending with inescapable tensions, an apex of confli ct, and a denoueme nt.
The Protestant/Catholic drama in the United States was a set of tensions between an immigrant Catholicism gaining its place after World
War n and a culturally regnant Protestant ethos gradually coming to
terms with religious pluralism. Many Protestants still saw Catho lics in
the United States as the local presence of European Catholicis m. They
had read Leo Xfll's fulminations against re ligious liberty and Churchstate separation, had observed Vatican policy in making C hurch-state
concordats, and saw how Spain was taken by Rome to exemplify the
establishment wanted by the Church. Murray's extensive w riting on
Church-state matters was a prolonged demonstration that the Church's
actions, policies, and theories in Church-state relations had historically
contingent elements. So me in the Church, highly placed at that, mistook post-Reformation, post-wars of re ligion alliances w ith confessional states as an immediate consequence of Catholic faith, treating
Spain as if universally normative. Catholicism in the United States had
never wanted establ ishment. Doubts about American Catholics were
unfounded. His inte rest ~as in citizens of all religions cooperating for
the common good and for the intellectual empowerment of Catholics to
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pick up their share of active citizenship in a religiously pluralist
democracy.
Murray's best-known b.ook, the preconcitiar We H,old These Truths:
Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition ( 1960) capped a theoretical explanation of how and why Catholics consented to the American experiment in full fidelitY to Catholic principles. 1 At the basis was
a theory of Church-state relations summed up in four principles. The
first principle was the irreducible difference in origin, activity, and end
of Church and state. The second principle was the effective spiritual
primacy of the Church and faith in relations with the political order.
The third principle was the integrity of the political order and its independence from ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The fourth principle affirmed
the immanent finality of Church and state to some manner of harmony
for the sake of those who belong to both simultaneously. Much of Murray's work concentrated on the third principle, which he took to be a
valid modem differentiation between sacred and secular. He understood
this to be true to Catholic tradition on Church and state and more particularly to Leo Xlll's development of it.
The election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 seemed to have settled in
practice what Murray had demonstrated in theory. It drew the Protestant/Catholic drama in the United States to its last act. The Catholic
faith, the outcome of the election showed, did no~ preclude a Catholic
citizen from becoming president. Kennedy' s executive prowess showed
it did not entail submission to the authority of the pope as temporal
ruler, as if American Catholics were subjects in the former papal states.
Finally, though, it was the 1965 Declaration on Ecumenism that removed the underlying premise for the post-Reformation, Protestant/
Catholic drama in every nation, at least from the Catholic side. The
older premise, that Protestant and Catholic were first of all antagonists
over Christian truth, beca me awareness that what we have in common
is greater than what di vides us. The ecumenical movement, among
Protestants who accept ~~umenism, the Orthodox, and CatholiCs, has
resolved the Protestant/Catholic drama in which Murray played a part.
Subsequently, the 2004 debate over another Catholic citizen's electoral
campaign in the United States advises that the Protestant/Catholic
drama has ceded to "culture wars" within the Catholic Church, as well
as among Protestant and Orthodox Americans. Murray's theory of civil
dialogue has much to offer this condition too.
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There was a second drama in Murray's theological life. Another set
of tensions sprang up between Murray and the dominant school of
thought on Church-state relations that had representatives in Rome and
in the United States. This was a tradition/modernity conflict. It played
out through conflict, resolution, and denouement in Murray's relations
with the Vatican. His book We Hold These Truths followed painful tension with Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani, Vatican Secretary of the Holy Office (now the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith), who
published and acted on a Church-state theory of tolerant establishment
where a predominantly Catholic population made this feasible, as it did
in Spain. The tragic climax was the silencing of Murray by his religious
superiors on the Church-state topic in 1954. Behind this lay a background of European Catholic difficulty in grasping that Catholics in the
United States, a mission country, were actually Catholic but inculturated in a different way. Many in Catholic Europe had seen the United
States as a Protestant nation, American Catholics as quasi-Protestant,
and the pairing of religious liberty with n~nestablishment as contrary
to Catholic tradition.
In response, Murray pointed to the historical contingency of the
post-Reformation confessional state in order to remove its ostensible
status as an arrangement that Catholic doctrines demanded as a necessary consequence of their truth. What the state owed the Church was
not establishment but protection of its citizens' religious liberty, so the
Church could flourish from its own native energies apart from state coercion. Murray distinguished Anglo-American constitutionalism from
what Leo XIII had learned about and condemned in democracy carried
by the French Revolution and its aftermath.
A lesser-known book by Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, made the case at Vatican II that conciliar development beyond
Leo's gravamen against religious liberty and Church-state separation
was possible because in historical context Leo inveighed only against
certain kinds of nineteenth-century, continental instantiations of these,
not all possible versions. 2 That Murray's view on this carried the day,
that he was a peritus at Vatican II in the first place, that he had a significant hand in drafting the Decree on Religious Liberty, and that he
received a special blessing from Paul VI, resolved the conflict with Ottaviani. Notable is the fact that Leo XIII, Catholic social teaching after
him, Murray, and Vatican II, all have taken their bearing on political
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life from Aquinas rathe r than Augustine's City of God. This poses a
challenge to neo-Augustinian social theologies.

..
CONCLUD I NG R EFLEC TI ON

In a monarchy o r nonde mocratic state, relations between C hurch and
state occur insofar as legitimate authorities representing each " perfect
society" meet and conduct business together. Church and state convened in meetings, or in re lationships carried out according to formal,
legal arrangements between popes and e mperors, popes and king s,
bishops a nd princes, cle rgy and magistrates. Leo broug ht forward recog nition that suc h relationships were not for the sake of authori ties
the mselves, o r o nly for the dignity of the offices they occupied, bu t
above all for the sake of peoples beneath them. The civis idem et christianus, the citizen (or subject) who was both under state and Church
authority, had duties to fulfill in both societies. If Church and state authorities were at odds to the ex tent that they commanded opposite acts,
the effect was to introduce division into the consciousness of Christians
who owed obedience to both. This interior conflict was contrary to the
peaceful conscience that the New Testa me nt commended as the condi ti on in whic h fo llowers of Christ could conduct their lives of faith unde r
God' s supre me authority in Christ, visibly represented by those succeeding the apostles, while also obeying legitimate po litical authority.
Pius X II took this a ste p further by identifying the person as the
source, agent, a nd end of all societal processes. This meant, and it was
carried through most fully in a democratic state, that C hurch-state relations were not only for the sake of the people who dutifully received
decisions made above their head s and the n harmoni zed the m. Rathe r,
the relations passed thro ugh the people. Ordinary people were involved
in and were agents in those relations. Murray clarified it as follows: ln
a democracy the first officer is the c itizen, not the e lected o r appointed
official. The citi zen is the state's representative in relating to the
C hurch. Who m does that•citizen e ncounte r as representati ve of the
C hurch? That same per on himself or herself as baptized believer, the
one person who is both believer and citizen is the meeting point.
A nonestablishment regime does not recognize the religious authority of a bishop , pope, or any Church authority as having j urisdiction
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over any part of the politica l order. So the conduct of Church-state relations devolves to the believer/citizen. ln them, in their consciences,
Church and state meet and seek a harmonious relationship. Conscience
becomes the meeting hall. The Church represented by the person-asbeliever and the state represented by the person-as-citizen are in continual, usually quiet session.
It follows, I suggest, that ecclesiastical authority cannot inter vene in
a Catholic citizen 's conscience by laying upon it a command to perform
or act on a particular political judgment. That prudential judgment,
rather, is an irreplaceable function of the believer's own conscience,
which al so has the obligation to form itself according to Catholic faith
and morality. To be sure, apostolic authority has every right to fulfill a
duty to preach and teach the gospel in its implications for public life
and for the political order of society. This might lead to making public
judgments on the immorality of specific public policies or their admin. istration. That is one thing; it is another thing to try to exercise ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the person's polit~cally prudenti al judgment.
That is, to attempt direct exercise of ecclesiastical authority over something political in nature, namely, the proper act of an informed citizen.
That turns the ecclesiastical act into an act of a political nature. No less
than commanding a government official to repress a heresy, this violates the hard-won differentiation between the temporal and the spiritual and runs against the spiritual mi ssion of the Church. Equally a
state, its government and officials have no basis and no authority to
command that an act of religious nature be performed by c itizens,
whe ther the act be internal like personal prayer or belief that God has
chosen one 's nation for the mission of spreading democracy, o r external-like attendance at worship or professing that the unborn are
nonhuman.
Leo Xlll and Murray's fourth principle, of a finality in Church and
state to a mode of harmony that permits peaceful consciences, does not
mean peace at any price. Nor does it imply that believers are to treat
their faith and their political views as if on par. Noth ing sugge ts anything other than that faith and discipleship are an all-encompassing
principle of interpretation, not to be subordinated to political convictions. Harmony presupposes and includes the exercise of political prudence and practical reason. So harmony does not result from what some
seem to think is the proper path- a unilateral, rapidly executed jump
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from faith to prudential decis'ions on specific laws or pobcies without
an intervening deliberation. To move from a biblical passage, a traditional theme, a papal teaching, a personal spirituality to a political decision without passing through analysis, discussion, reading, and
reflection precisely on the political level, is to bypass the virtue of prudence, rather than to stand for the demands of faith. This would be practical fideism.
Consciences, not legislatures or Vatican halls, are host to the most
intimate, durable, and influential Church/state relationships. This was
how Murray envisioned the dignity and role of conscience in regard to
Church and the political order, not so much as a demand for freedom,
but as the arena wherein the gospel meets and guides political life.
Consequently, he placed a good deal of value in Church authorities
exercising the power of the Church to influence society indirectly by
helping the faithful to form their consciences in light of Catholic faith
and morality. Direct influence by means of prelates inserting their influence into chambers of law above the heads of believer-citizens, or
seeking to steer democratic processes by commanding a political act,
runs contrary to the Church/state difference. Strictly speaking, though
Murray did not draw this conclusion explicitly, it seems that pope,
bishop, or clergy would have no basis for commanding believers to vote
this way or that, to take this or that political ac;tion. However, the indirect influence of apostolic authority on society by educative formation
of consciences is an obligation. Catholics have a correlative duty to
learn and to act on the implications of their faith for the temporal order
of society, including its morality. Murray insisted, and took his cue
from Pope Pius XII on this, that the moral order and legal orders were
distinct, that the passage from the moral order to the legal order depended greatly on historical, cultural, social context and conditions;
that social peace was of such value that in a pluralist society, it could
demand restraint from seeking a direct passage from the moral order to
the legal order in a given matter.
It has turned out that practical and theoretical tensions around the
second and fourth principles in Catholic Church-state theory have outlived M~rray, making him a character in a plot without a climax, resolution, and denouement. He participated in the larger historical drama
arising from tensions between Catholicism and American political life.
His basic position is now less taken for granted as a direction for future
development, unfortunately. Problems attendant upon some modes of

..
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episcopal presence in American public life would have been averted or
ameliorated were Murray better known to today's prelates. Critiques
that reject rather than criticize and develop his contribution seem to
have lo t confidence in the potential for social change in democracy, or
to have reverted to an Augustinian political theology in the name of
authentic Catholicity. Whatever the cause, the fact is that Murray's con. tribution has not connected with many bishops. Critkal appropriatio n
and development of his Church-state thought is needed.
ln light of a theology of religious pluralism today, it can be added
that in some analogous way the Church/state difference pertains to and
supports the spiritual integrity of any religion as well as affirms its independence from jurisdiction of any political authority.

